Report Details Iran's Secret Procurement Network Amid US Sanctions

A media investigation has reported that Iran established a vast network of numbered agencies to import at least $2 billion in military hardware, explosives, and heavy-duty vehicles between January 2025 and June 2026, bypassing Western sanctions and a US naval blockade.

According to the published findings, more than 5,000 agencies operating under names starting with "MOD" form a parallel procurement system. Shipping records, banking documents, and trade data indicate that these entities acquired items such as rocket propellants, aircraft engine components, and detonators from origins including China, Russia, and Germany.

Structure and Financing of the Network

The investigation, conducted in collaboration with risk analysis consultancy 240 Analytics, traces the origins of the numbered agencies to a shared address in Tehran with Iran's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). While incorporation documents list the founding date as February 11, 1979, documents indicate they were largely established in 2013 as economic restrictions intensified.

Key findings regarding the network's operations include:

• Parallel Trade System: The agencies utilize foreign shell companies and intermediaries, funded by illicit oil sales, to purchase goods.
• Alternative Settlements: Approximately 97% of reviewed shipments were reportedly settled via cash held in foreign bank accounts rather than international wire transfers, minimizing sanctions alerts.
• Prominent Entities: A single agency designated as MOD 346428 emerged as a major importer, with customs data cited in local media showing overseas purchases rising significantly in recent years.

Continued Imports Through Disruptions

The report indicates that shipments continued after conflict began in early 2026, entering via land, sea, and air routes. Deliveries reportedly included titanium from China, nitrocellulose, and detonators from Russia, arriving via the Caspian Sea, Central Asian land routes, and freight aircraft.

Weapons and sanctions experts noted that while many imported items have dual-use applications, a significant portion was classified specifically as military equipment supporting missile and drone programs.

Verification and Discovery

The network was initially identified by an analyst at 240 Analytics who reviewed leaked Bank Sepah documents obtained from Telegram and WikiIran. Independent verification of the trade data was conducted by cross-referencing approximately 19,000 import records against shipping documents, state media reports, and social media footage. Official claims regarding the network's function and scale continue to be evaluated by international trade and sanctions monitors.